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1 Indeed, l*(A) = inf{1  p(x)jx R A} holds true onlyIn this paper we present several fuzzy logics trying to capture different notions of necessity
(in the sense of possibility theory) for Gödel logic formulas. Based on different character-
izations of necessity measures on fuzzy sets, a group of logics with Kripke style semantics
is built over a restricted language, namely, a two-level language composed of non-modal
and modal formulas, the latter, moreover, not allowing for nested applications of the modal
operator N. Completeness and some computational complexity results are shown.
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The handling and modelling of uncertainty is a key issue in artiﬁcial intelligence reasoning tasks. The most general notion
of uncertainty is captured by monotone set functions with two natural boundary conditions. In the literature, these functions
have received several names, like Sugeno measures [29] or plausibility measures [24]. Many popular uncertainty measures, like
probabilities, upper and lower probabilities, Dempster–Shafer plausibility and belief functions, or possibility and necessity
measures, can be seen as particular classes of Sugeno measures.
In this paper, we specially focus on possibilistic models of uncertainty. A possibility measure on a Boolean algebra of events
U ¼ ðU;^;_;:; 0U ; 1UÞ is a Sugeno measure l : U ! ½0;1 (i.e. it satisﬁes lð0UÞ ¼ 0; lð1UÞ ¼ 1 and l*(u1) 6 l*(u2) whenever
u1 6 u2) such that the following _-decomposition propertylðu1 _ u2Þ ¼ maxlðu1Þ;lðu2ÞÞ
holds. A necessity measure is a Sugeno measure l* satisfying the ^-decomposition propertylðu1 ^ u2Þ ¼ minðlðu1Þ;lðu2ÞÞ:
Possibility and necessity are dual classes of measures, in the sense that if l* is a possibility measure, then the function
l(u) = 1  l*(:u) is a necessity measure, and vice versa. If U is the power set of a set X, then any dual pair of measures
(l*,l) on U is induced by a normalized possibility distribution, i.e. a mapping p :X? [0,1] such that, supx2Xp(x) = 1, and,
for any A # X,1lðAÞ ¼ supfpðxÞjx 2 Ag and lðAÞ ¼ inff1 pðxÞjx R Ag:. All rights reserved.
he conference paper [9].
iiia.csic.es (P. Dellunde), godo@iiia.csic.es (L. Godo), enrico@iiia.csic.es (E. Marchioni).
when A– X, when A = X then it must be l*(A) = 1.
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tion formalisms by attaching some belief quantiﬁcation to declarative statements. In this line, possibilistic logic is a weighted
logic that handles possibilistic uncertainty by associating certainty, or priority levels, to classical logic formulas [13]. Possi-
bilistic logic (propositional) formulas are pairs (u,r), where u is a classical propositional formula and r 2 (0,1] is interpreted
as a lower bound for the necessity of u. The semantics is given by possibility distributions on the set X of classical interpre-
tations. Namely, if p :X? [0,1], then p satisﬁes a pair (u,r), written p  (u,r) when Np(u) = inf{1  p(w)jw 2
X,w(u) = 0}P r. Possibilistic logic is axiomatized by taking as axioms the axioms of Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC)
with weight 1 and as inference rules:
– from (u,a) and (u? w,b) infer (w,min(a,b)) (weighted modus ponens);
– from (u,a) infer (u,b), with b 6 a (weight weakening).
Since its introduction in the mid-80s, multiple facets of possibilistic logic have been developed and used for a number of
applications in AI, like handling exceptions in default reasoning, modeling belief revision, providing a graphical Bayesian-like
network representation counterpart to a possibilistic logic knowledge base or representing positive and negative informa-
tion in a bipolar setting with applications to preferences fusion and to version space learning. Moreover, possibilistic logic
copes with inconsistency by taking advantage of the stratiﬁcation of the set of formulas induced by the associated levels. It is
also useful for representing preferences expressed as sets of prioritized goals: in this case, the weight is to be understood as
the priority level of a goal. Several extensions of possibilistic logic deal with time, multiple agents’ mutual beliefs, a symbolic
treatment of priorities for handling partial orders between levels, or learning stratiﬁed hypotheses for coping with excep-
tions. The reader is referred to [13] for an extensive overview on possibilistic logic and its main applications.
When we go beyond the classical framework of Boolean algebras of events to more general frameworks, appropriate
extensions of uncertainty measures need to be considered in order to represent and reason about the uncertainty of non-
classical or fuzzy events. For instance, the notion of (ﬁnitely additive) probability has been generalized in the setting of
MV-algebras by means of the notion of state [18,19,25]2 and has been used in [16] to provide a logical framework for reasoning
about the probability of (ﬁnitely-valued) fuzzy events.
Within the possibilistic framework, several extensions of the notions of possibility and necessity measures for fuzzy sets
have been proposed in different logical systems extending the well-known Dubois–Lang–Prade’s possibilistic logic to fuzzy
events, see e.g. [2,3,4,11,12,14,21]. Actually, the different generalizations proposed in the literature arise from two observa-
tions. First of all, in contraposition to the classical case, [0,1]-valued mappings on the set of fuzzy sets in some (ﬁnite) do-
main X, P, N : [0,1]X? [0,1] satisfying the usual boundary conditions P(;) = N(;) = 0 and P(X) = N(X) = 1 and the
characteristic decomposition properties2 Ano
3 The
implicaPðA _ BÞ ¼maxðPðAÞ;PðBÞÞ; NðA ^ BÞ ¼minðNðAÞ;NðBÞÞ;
for any A, B 2 [0,1]X where _ and ^ denote the pointwise maximum and minimum operations, are not univocally determined
by a possibility distribution p on the set X. The second observation is that in the classical case the expressions of possibility
and necessity measures on subsets of a set X in terms of a possibility distribution on X can be equivalently rewritten as:PðAÞ ¼ sup
x2X
minðpðxÞ;AðxÞÞ; NðAÞ ¼ inf
x2X
maxð1 pðxÞ;AðxÞÞ;where the subset A # X is identiﬁed with its membership function A :X? {0,1}. Therefore, natural generalizations of these
expressions when A :X? [0,1] is a fuzzy subset of X arePðAÞ ¼ sup
x2X
pðxÞ  AðxÞ; NðAÞ ¼ inf
x2X
pðxÞ ) AðxÞ; ðÞwhere  is a t-norm and ) is some suitable fuzzy implication function.3
In particular, the following implication functions have been discussed in the literature as instantiations of the ) opera-
tion in ():
(1) u)KD v = max(1  u,v) (Kleene–Dienes implication);
(2) u)RG v ¼ 1; if u 6 v1 u; otherwise

(reciprocal of Gödel implication);
(3) u)Ł v = min(1,1u + v) (Łukasiewicz implication).
All these functions actually lead to proper extensions of the above deﬁnition of necessity over classical sets or events in the
sense that if A is a crisp set, i.e. A(x) 2 {0,1} for all x 2 X, then () gives N(A) = infx2X{max(1  p(x),A(x))}. In the literature dif-
ferent logical formalizations to reason about such extensions of the necessity of fuzzy events can be found. In [23], and later
in [22], a full many-valued modal approach is developed over ﬁnitely-valued Łukasiewicz logics in order to capture thether generalization of the notion of probability has been recently studied in depth in [1] by deﬁning probabilistic states over Gödel algebras.
minimum properties required to a binary operation ) : [0,1]  [0,1]? [0,1] to be considered as fuzzy counterpart of the classical {0,1}-valued
tion truth-function are: 1) 1 = 0) 0 = 1, 1) 0 = 0, ) is non-increasing in the ﬁrst variable and non-decreasing in the second variable.
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relying on )KD and )RG, respectively. More recently, following the approach of [16], modal-like logics to reason about
the necessity of fuzzy events in the framework of MV-algebras have been deﬁned in [17] in order to capture the notion
of necessity deﬁned by )KD and )Ł.
The purpose of this paper is to explore different logical approaches to reason about the necessity of fuzzy events over Gödel
fuzzy logic. In more concrete terms, our aim is to study a modal-like expansion of the [0,1]-valued Gödel logic with a modal-
ity N such that the truth-value of a formula Nu (in [0,1]) can be interpreted as the degree of necessity of u. In this context,
although it does not extend the classical possibilistic logic, it seems also interesting to investigate the notion of necessity
deﬁnable from Gödel implication, which corresponds to the standard fuzzy interpretation of the implication connective in
Gödel logic:
(4) u)G v ¼ 1; if u 6 vv ; otherwise

(Gödel implication).
This work is structured as follows. After this introduction and recalling some background on Gödel fuzzy logic and related
concepts, in Section 3 we recall a characterization of necessity measures on fuzzy sets deﬁned by the implications)KD and
)RG and provide a (new) characterization of those deﬁned by)G. These characterizations are the basis for the completeness
results of several logics introduced in Sections 4–6 capturing the corresponding notions of necessity for Gödel logic formulas.
These logics, with Kripke style semantics, are built over a two-level language composed of modal and non-modal formulas,
the former not allowing nested applications of the modal operator. A common fragment of these logics akin to classical pos-
sibilistic logic is considered in Section 8. Some remarks about the computational complexity for these logics are made in Sec-
tion 9. Finally, in Section 10, we mention some open problems and new research goals we plan to address in the near future.
2. Preliminaries on the Gödel fuzzy logic G and its expansions GD(C)
All this section is devoted to preliminaries on the Gödel fuzzy logic G and its expansions GD(C). We present their syntax
and semantics, their main logical properties and the notation we use throughout the article.
The language of Gödel propositional logic is built as usual from a countable set of propositional variables V, the constant 0
and the binary connectives ^ and ?. Disjunction and negation are, respectively, deﬁned as u _ w :¼ ((u? w)? w) ^
((w? u)? u) and as :u :¼ u! 0, and the constant 1 is taken as 0! 0.
As a many-valued logic, Gödel logic is the axiomatic extension of Hájek’s Basic Fuzzy Logic BL [22] (which is the logic of
continuous t-norms and their residua) by means of the contraction axiom u? (u ^ u). Since the unique idempotent con-
tinuous t-norm is the minimum, this yields that Gödel logic is strongly complete with respect to its standard fuzzy semantics
that interprets formulas over the structure [0,1]G = ([0,1],min,)G,0,1),4 i.e. semantics deﬁned by truth-evaluations e such
that e(u ^ w) = min(e(u),e(w)), e(u? w) = e(u))G e(w) and eð0Þ ¼ 0. As a consequence e(u _ w) = max(e(u),e(w)) and
e(:u) = :Ge(u) = e(u))G 0.
Gödel logic can also be seen as the axiomatic extension of intuitionistic propositional logic by the prelinearity axiom
(u? w) _ (w? u). Its algebraic semantics is therefore given by the variety of prelinear Heyting algebras, also known as
Gödel algebras. A Gödel algebra is a structure A = (A,,),0,1) which is a (bounded, integral, commutative) residuated lattice
satisfying the contraction equation4 Callx  x ¼ x
and prelinearity equationðx) yÞ _ ðy) xÞ ¼ 1;
where x _ y = ((x) y)) y)((y) x)) x)). Gödel algebras are locally ﬁnite, i.e. given a Gödel algebra A and a ﬁnite set F of
elements of A, the Gödel subalgebra generated by F is ﬁnite as well.
On the other hand, Hájek also shows [22] that Gödel logic can be expanded with the so-called Monteiro–Baaz’s projection
connective D. Truth-evaluations of Gödel logic are extended adding the stipulation e(Du) = d(e(u)) wheredðxÞ ¼ 1; if x ¼ 1
0; otherwise:
Axioms and rules for GD are those of Gödel logic plus the following axioms:ðD1Þ Du _ :Du ðD2Þ Dðu _ wÞ ! ðDu _ DwÞ
ðD3Þ Du! u ðD4Þ Du! DDu
ðD5Þ Dðu! wÞ ! ðDu! DwÞand the Necessitation rule for D: from u derive Du. GD is shown to be standard complete (i.e. w.r.t. the structure
½0;1GD ¼ ð½0;1;min;)G; d;0;1Þ) for deductions from ﬁnite theories.ed standard Gödel algebra.
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deduction theorem for GD reads as follows: C [ fug ‘GD w iff C ‘GD Du! w.
Finally, the logic GD can be expanded with truth-constants r for each r belonging to a countable C # [0,1], containing 0
and 1 (in particular one may take C ¼ ½0;1 \Q, the set of rational numbers in the real unit interval). Additional axioms of
GD(C) [15] are book-keeping axioms for the different connectives of the logics: namely, for any r, s 2 C, the axioms
r ^ s$minðr; sÞ, r ! s$ r)G s, and the axioms Dr $ dðrÞ. So deﬁned, the logic GD(C) can be shown to satisfy the same
deduction theorem as GD and to be standard complete for deductions from ﬁnite theories w.r.t. the standard structure
½0;1GD expanded with truth-constants r interpreted by their own value
5 r, for each r 2 C. In case of expanding GD with a ﬁnite
set of truth-constants C, Hájek already proved that the resulting logic GD(C) is strongly standard complete [22, Theorem 4.2.21].
As a last remark, let us notice that the algebraic semantics for GD(C) is given by the varieties of GD(C)-algebras, which are
expansions of Gödel algebras deﬁned in the natural way, and are also locally ﬁnite.
3. Some representable classes of necessity measures over Gödel algebras of fuzzy sets and their characterizations
Let (L,6,0,1) be a bounded linearly ordered set. Let X be a ﬁnite set and let F(X) = LX be the set of functions f :X? L, in other
words, the set of L-fuzzy sets over X. F(X) can be regarded as a Gödel algebra equipped with the pointwise extension of the
operations of the linearly ordered Gödel algebra over L. In the following, for each r 2 L, we will denote by r the constant func-
tion rðxÞ ¼ r for all x 2 X.
In this section we provide characterizations of some classes of necessity measures on Gödel algebras of functions of F(X)
which are representable in terms of possibility distributions p :X? L and implication functions considered in the Introduc-
tion. But we ﬁrst introduce a general notion of basic necessity over particular subsets of F(X) that encompasses all those rep-
resentable classes, just by requiring to satisfy the corresponding extensions of the two deﬁning properties in the Boolean
case. For the sake of a simpler notation we denote by F(X) both the set of L-fuzzy sets over X and the Gödel algebra of func-
tions which has as domain this set.
Deﬁnition 1. Let L be a bounded linearly ordered set and let U# FðXÞ be closed under ^ and such that 0; 1 2 U . A mapping
N : U ! L satisfying
(N1) N(f ^ g) = min(N(f),N(g)),
(N2) NðrÞ ¼ r; for all r 2 L such that r 2 U
is called a basic necessity.
If U# FðXÞ is a Gödel subalgebra and N : U ! L is a basic necessity then it is easy to check that N also satisﬁes the follow-
ing properties:
(i) min(N(f),N(:Gf)) = 0,
(ii) N(f)G g) 6 N(f))G N(g),
where :Gf ¼ f )G 0. The classes of necessity measures based on the Kleene–Dienes implication and the reciprocal of Gödel
implication have been already characterized in [3,2], but we provide the proof below to keep the paper self-contained. We do
not consider here the one based on Łukasiewicz implication, which was addressed in [17]. Notice that, for these character-
izations to work one has to consider necessities over the full set of functions F(X).
For each x 2 X, let us denote by x its characteristic function, i.e. the function in F(X) such that x(y) = 1, if y = x and x(y) = 0,
otherwise. Observe that each f 2 F(X) can be written as5 If D
own vaf ¼
^
x2X
x) f ðxÞ;where) is an implication function (as the ones introduced in Section 1) such that 1) u = u for any u 2 L. Therefore, if N is a
basic necessity on F(X), by (N1) we haveNðf Þ ¼ inf
x2X
Nðx) f ðxÞÞ:Using this then we have the following characterizations.
Proposition 2 (cf. [3,2]). Let N:F(X)? L be a basic necessity over F(X), where {0,1} # L # [0,1] is closed by the standard
negation n(x) = 1  x. Then we have:was not present in the logic, we would still have completeness but w.r.t. to algebras over [0,1] with truth-constants not necessarily interpreted by their
lues.
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ðNKDÞ Nðr)KD f Þ ¼ r)KD Nðf Þ
if and only if there exists a normalized possibility distribution p :X? L such that, for all f 2 F(X), N(f) = infx2X(p(x))KD f(x));(ii) N satisﬁes the following property for all f 2 F(X) and r 2 L:
ðNRGÞ Nðr)KD f Þ ¼ r)G Nðf Þ
if and only if there exists a normalized possibility distribution p :X? L such that, for all f 2 F(X), N(f) = infx2X(p(x))RG f(x)).Proof. (i) Assume N is deﬁned as N(f) = infx2X(p(x))KD f(x)). Then, since 1 r ¼ 1 r;Nðr)KD f Þ ¼ infx2Xðð1 pðxÞÞ_
ð1 rÞ _ f ðxÞÞ ¼ ð1 rÞ _ infx2Xðð1 pðxÞÞ _ f ðxÞÞ ¼ r)KD Nðf Þ. As for the other direction, assume N satisﬁes (NKD). From
the above remarks, for each f 2 F(X) we have Nðf Þ ¼ infx2XNðx)KD f ðxÞÞ ¼ infx2XNð1 f ðxÞ )KD ð1 xÞÞ. Now, deﬁning
p(x) = 1  N(1  x) and applying (NKD), we get N(f) = infx2X(1  f(x)))KD (1  p(x)) = infx2Xp(x))KD f(x).
(ii) Assume N is deﬁned as N(f) = infx2X(p(x))RG f(x)). We use the fact that, for any u, v, t 2 [0,1], it is easy to check that the
identity u)RG (v _ t) = (1  t))G (u)RG v) holds. Then, again since 1 r ¼ 1 r, we have Nðr)KD f Þ ¼ infx2XðpðxÞ )RG
ðr)KD f ÞðxÞÞ ¼ infx2XðpðxÞ )RG ð1 r _ f ðxÞÞÞ ¼ r)G ðinfx2XpðxÞ )RG f ðxÞÞ ¼ r)G Nðf Þ. Conversely, assume N satisﬁes
(NRG). Then, reasoning as above and deﬁning p(x) = 1  N(1  x), we have Nðf Þ ¼ infx2XNðx)KD f ðxÞÞ ¼
infx2XNð1 f ðxÞ )KD ð1 xÞÞ ¼ infx2Xð1 f ðxÞÞ )G Nð1 xÞ ¼ infx2XpðxÞ )RG f ðxÞ. h
The characterization of the necessity measures based on the Gödel implication function is a bit more involved since it
requires the presence of an associated class of possibility measures which are not dual in the usual strong sense.
Deﬁnition 3. Let U# FðXÞ be a Gödel subalgebra. A mapping P : U ! L satisfying
(P1) P(f _ g) = max(P(f),P(g)),
(P2) PðrÞ ¼ r; for all r 2 L such that r 2 U
is called a basic possibility.
Note that if P : U# FðXÞ ! L is a basic possibility then it also satisﬁes max(P(:Gf), P(:G:Gf)) = 1. Now observe that each
f 2 F(X) can be written asf ¼
_
x2X
x ^ f ðxÞand hence, since at the beginning of this section we have assumed that X is ﬁnite, if P is a basic possibility on F(X), by (P1)
we havePðf Þ ¼ sup
x2X
Pðx ^ f ðxÞÞ:Proposition 4. Let P :F(X)? L be a basic possibility over F(X). P further satisﬁes
(P3) Pðf ^ rÞ ¼minðPðf Þ; rÞ; for all r 2 L
iff there exists a normalized p :X? L and, for all f 2 F(X), P(f) = supx2Xmin(p(x), f(x)).Proof. One direction is easy. Conversely, assume that P :F(X)? L satisﬁes (P1) and (P3). Then, taking into account the
above observations, we havePðf Þ ¼ sup
x2X
Pðx ^ f ðxÞÞ ¼ sup
x2X
minðPðxÞ; f ðxÞÞ:Hence, the claim easily follows by deﬁning p(x) =P(x). hProposition 5. Let N:F(X)? L be a basic necessity and P :F(X)? L be a basic possibility satisfying (P3). N and P further satisfy
(NP) Nðf )G rÞ ¼ Pðf Þ )G r, for all r 2 L
iff there exists a normalized p :X? L and, for all f 2 F(X),
Nðf Þ ¼ inf
x2X
pðxÞ )G f ðxÞ and Pðf Þ ¼ sup
x2X
minðpðxÞ; f ðxÞÞ:
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f 2 F(X). It is clear that so deﬁned N and P are a basic necessity and a basic possibility, respectively. But we also have
Nðf )G rÞ ¼ infx2XðpðxÞ )G ðf ðxÞ )G rÞÞ ¼ infx2XððpðxÞ ^ f ðxÞÞ )G rÞ ¼ ðsupx2XpðxÞ ^ f ðxÞÞ )G r ¼ Pðf Þ )G r. Hence, P and N
satisfy (NP).
Conversely, suppose that N and P are a basic necessity and possibility satisfying (NP). Then, deﬁning p:X? L by
p(x) =P(x) for each x 2 X, we have Nðf Þ ¼ infx2XNðx)G f ðxÞÞ ¼ infx2XPðxÞ )G f ðxÞ ¼ infx2XpðxÞ )G f ðxÞ. Moreover, if P also
satisﬁes (P3), by Proposition 4, we have P(f) = supx2Xmin(p(x), f(x)). h4. The logic of basic necessity NG0(C)
In this and the following three sections we deﬁne several logics to capture reasoning about the necessity of fuzzy events,
understood as equivalence classes of formulas of Gödel logic with a ﬁnite set of truth-constants C. Following previous ap-
proaches like [22], the idea is to introduce a modal operator N such that, for every formula u of the logic GD(C), Nu is a fuzzy
proposition which reads ‘‘u is certain” whose truth-value is to be interpreted as the necessity degree of u. The logics we will
deﬁne next are built over a two-level language: non-modal formulas to describe and reason about the events and modal for-
mulas (without nesting of the operators N) to represent and reason about the certainty or necessity of the non-modal for-
mulas. Since possibilistic models are basically qualitative models of uncertainty (the comparative ordering is what
matters rather than absolute degrees), we choose again Gödel logic (with a ﬁnite set of truth-constants) as the fuzzy logic
to reason about the modal Nu formulas. Due to the semantics of the logic GD(C) one can express that the necessity of u
is at least r or at most s (with r, s 2 C) by the formulas r ! Nu and Nu! s, while a formula Nu? Nw expresses the qual-
itative comparative statement ‘‘w is at least as certain as u”.
The particular semantics of the necessity operators Nwill vary from one section to the other. In this section we axiomatize
the operators N whose semantics is given by the class of basic necessity measures, while in the following sections we will
successively consider the logics for the operators N whose semantics are given by the three classes of representable
measures studied in Section 3. As shown there, the basic differences between all these logics will be the way N handles
truth-constants, this is a main reason to include a set C of truth-constants in the languages of both modal and non-modal
formulas of our logics. A second reason is to be able to express statements of the kind ‘‘the necessity of u is at least r”, as
explained above.
4.1. Syntax of NG0(C)
Let us ﬁx a set of propositional variables V and a countable set C# ½0;1 \Q containing 0 and 1.
The language of NG0(C) consists of two classes of formulas:
(i) the set Fm (V,C) of non-modal formulasu,w, . . ., which are formulas of GD(C) (Gödel logic G expanded with the Monte-
iro–Baaz’s projection connective D and truth-constants r for each rational r 2 C  [0,1]) built from the set of proposi-
tional variables V = {p1,p2, . . .};
(ii) and the set MFm(V,C) of modal formulas U,W, . . ., built from atomic modal formulas Nu, with u 2 Fm(V,C),
where N denotes the modality necessity, using the connectives from GD and truth-constants r for each rational
r 2 C  [0,1]. Notice that nested modalities are not allowed. By ‘‘modal theory” we will simply mean a set of modal
formulas.
The axioms of the logic NG0(C) of basic necessity are the axioms of GD(C) for non-modal and modal formulas plus the fol-
lowing necessity related modal axioms:
(N1) N(u? w)? (Nu? Nw)
(N2) NðrÞ $ r; for each r 2 C# ½0;1 \Q.
The rules of inference of NG0(C) are modus ponens (for modal and non-modal formulas) and necessitation for non-modal
formulas: ifu is a theorem of GD(C) then Nu is a theorem of NG0(C). These axioms and rules deﬁne a notion of proof, denoted
‘NG0ðCÞ, in the usual way. It is worth noting that NG0(C) proves the formula N(u ^ w)M (Nu ^ Nw), which encodes the char-
acteristic property of necessity measures.
In the particular case of no additional truth-constants in the language other than 1 and 0, i.e. when C = {0,1}, there is no
need to consider the expansion with the D operator, and hence one should consider the logic G instead of the logic GD(C).
4.2. Semantics of NG0(C)
For the semantics of NG0(C) we consider several classes of possibilistic Kripke models.
A C-basic necessity Kripke model is a system M¼ hW; e; Ii where:
P. Dellunde et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 63–75 69 W is a non-empty set whose elements are called nodes or worlds,
 e :W  V? [0,1] is such that, for each w 2W, e(w, 	) :V? [0,1] is an evaluation of propositional variables which is
extended to a GD(C)-evaluation of non-modal formulas of Fm(V,C) in the usual way.
 For each u 2 Fm(V,C) we deﬁne its associated function u^ : W ! ½0;1, where u^ðwÞ ¼ eðw;uÞ. Let dFmðV; CÞ ¼
fu^ju 2 FmðV;CÞg
 I : dFmðV;CÞ ! ½0; 1 is a basic necessity over dFmðV;CÞ(as a G-algebra), i.e. it satisﬁes
(i) Ið^rÞ ¼ r, for all r 2 C# ½0;1 \Q,
(ii) Iðu^1 ^ u^2Þ ¼ minðIðu^1Þ; Iðu^2ÞÞ.
Now, given a modal formula U, the truth-value of U in M¼ hW; e; Ii, denoted kUkM, is inductively deﬁned as follows:
 If U is an atomic modal formula Nu, then kNukM ¼ Iðu^Þ
 If U is a non-atomic modal formula, then its truth-value is computed by evaluating its atomic modal subformulas, and
then by using the truth-functions associated to the GD(C)-connectives occurring in U.
We will denote by NðCÞ the class of C-basic necessity Kripke models.
4.3. Completeness of NG0(C)
Taking into account that GD(C)-algebras are locally ﬁnite, following the same approach of [17] with the necessary modi-
ﬁcations, one can prove the following result.
Theorem 6. Let C# ½0;1 \Q be ﬁnite. NG0(C) is sound and complete for modal theories w.r.t. the class NðCÞ of C-basic necessity
Kripke models.Proof. Let C and U be a modal theory and a modal formula, respectively, and assume C 0NG0ðCÞ U. We will prove that there
exists a basic necessity Kripke model M satisfying C but not U. We follow the strategy adopted in [16,22] that amounts to
translating theories over NG0(C) into theories over GD(C). For each modal formulaW, let us denote byWw the corresponding
GD(C)-formula obtained from W by considering any atomic subformula of the form Nu as a new propositional variable.
Deﬁne, therefore, Cw = {WwjW 2 C} andAxH ¼ f!Hj! is an instance of axiom ðNiÞ; i ¼ 1;2g [ fðNuÞHj 0GDðCÞ ug:
Using the same technique used in [22] it is not difﬁcult to prove thatC 0NG0ðCÞ U iff C
H [ AxH 0GDðCÞ UH: ð1ÞNow, since GD(C) is strongly complete for C ﬁnite [22, Theorem 4.2.21], we know that there exists a GD(C)-evaluation v that is
a model of Cw [ Axw such that v(Uw) < 1. We deﬁne then the following Kripke model:M¼ ðW; e; IÞ, whereW is the set of G-
evaluations of propositional variables V, e :W  V? [0,1] deﬁned by
 e(w,pi) = w(pi), for all w 2W and pi 2 V,
and extended to GD(C)-formulas as usual, and I : dFmðV;CÞ ! ½0;1 deﬁned by
 Iðu^Þ ¼ vððNuÞHÞ.
It is fairly easy to see that M is indeed a Kripke model equipped with a basic necessity I, since:
(i) Iðu^ ^ w^Þ ¼ Ið du ^ wÞ ¼ vððNðu ^ wÞÞHÞ ¼ vððNuÞH ^ ðNwÞHÞ ¼minðvððNuÞHÞ;vððNwÞHÞÞ ¼ minðIðu^Þ; Iðw^ÞÞ:
(ii) Ið^rÞ ¼ vððNrÞHÞ ¼ vðrÞ ¼ r, for each r 2 C.
Notice that the only constant functions in dFmðV;CÞ are those of the form ^r for r 2 C. And that whileM is a model for C, it
holds that kUkM < 1. h
Actually, when the set of propositional variables V is assumed to be ﬁnite, by suitably modifying the above proof one can
prove that NG0(C) is not only complete w.r.t. the class NðCÞ of basic necessity Kripke models but also w.r.t. the subclass of
ﬁnite structures (and hence also w.r.t. the subclass of rational-valued structures).
Corollary 7. Let V and C be ﬁnite. Then NG0(C) is complete for ﬁnite modal theories w.r.t. the class of ﬁnite C-basic necessity Kripke
models.
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Cw [ Axw such that v(Uw) < 1. Since the variety of Gödel algebras is locally ﬁnite, the set of equivalence classes of formulas
of Fm(V,C) modulo provable equivalence is ﬁnite as well. Hence we may assume that Axw is ﬁnite as well. Moreover, since the
set of tautologies of G is the intersection of the tautologies of the n-valued Gödel logics Gn, the above implies that there exists
a sufﬁciently large n 2 N such that Uw does not follow from Cw [ Axw over Gn, D(C), the ﬁnitely-valued Gödel logic Gn, with
truth-values Cn = {0,1/n, . . . ,1}, expanded with D and truth-constants from C # Cn. Therefore, we have that
CH [ AxH 2Gn;DðCÞ U
I, i.e. there exists a Cn-valued Gödel assignment v0 such that v0(Ww) = 1 for all Ww 2 Cw [ Axwand
v0(Uw) < 1.
We deﬁne the following Kripke model: M¼ ðWn; e; IÞ, where Wn is the ﬁnite set of Gn-evaluations of propositional
variables V, e :Wn  V? Cn deﬁned by. e(w,p) =w(p), for all w 2Wn and p 2 V
and extended to Gn,D(Cn) formulas as usual using Gn, D(C) logic connectives, and I : dFmðV;CÞ ! Cn is deﬁned by
 Iðu^Þ ¼ v 0ððNuÞHÞ.
In particular, since v0 is a model of the translation of the (N2) axiom, for each r 2 Cwe have Ið^rÞ ¼ v 0ððNrÞHÞ ¼ v 0ðrÞ ¼ r, for
each r 2 C. It is easy to check that, so deﬁned, I is a basic necessity, and hence M is indeed a ﬁnite basic necessity Kripke
model. Notice also that Iðu^Þ ¼ v 0ððNuÞHÞ if u 2 Fm(V,C). Finally, one can check that M is a model for C and that
kUkM < 1. h
Let us say that a modal formula U is 1-satisﬁable if there exists a necessity Kripke structure M¼ hW; e; Ii such that
kUkM ¼ 1. As a corollary of the model construction in the above proof, we have the following result.
Corollary 8. Let U be a modal formula of MFm(V,C) with V and C ﬁnite. If U is 1-satisﬁable then it is satisﬁable in a ﬁnite model,
that is, there exists M¼ hW; e; Ii with W being ﬁnite such that kUkM ¼ 1.Proof. The condition ofU being 1-satisﬁable is equivalent to the condition that :DU is not a valid formula in the class NðCÞ
of basic necessity Kripke models, and then, following the proof of the completeness result in Corollary 7, one can build a
ﬁnite model M where k:DUkM < 1, i.e. where kUkM ¼ 1. h
In next sections we consider extensions of NG0(C) which faithfully capture the three different notions of necessity mea-
sures introduced before.5. The Kleene–Dienes implication-based necessity logic NGKD(C)
In this section we assume C to be closed by the standard negation, i.e. if r 2 C, then 1  r 2 C as well. We start by consid-
ering the following additional axiom:
(NKD) Nðr _uÞ $ ðr _ NuÞ; for each r 2 C
Let NGKD(C) be the axiomatic extension of NG0(C) with the axiom (NKD). The aim is to show completeness of NGKD(C) with
respect to the subclass N KDðCÞ of NðCÞ structuresM = (W,e, I) such that for every u 2 Fm(V,C), Iðu^Þ ¼ infw2WpðwÞ )KD u^ðwÞ
for some possibility distribution p :W? [0,1] on the set of possible worlds W.
Lemma 9. Let C # C0. Then NGKD(C0) is a conservative extension of NGKD(C).Proof. Let C and U be a modal theory and a modal formula, respectively, in the language of NGKD(C), i.e.
C [ {U} # MFm(V,C), such that C
NGKDðC0 ÞU. Reasoning as in Theorem 6, C ‘NGKDðC0 Þ U iff CH [ AxH ‘GDðC0 Þ UH, where Ax is
the set of instances of the axioms using only constants from C. Now, the lemma follows using the fact that GD(C0) is a con-
servative extension of GD(C). hTheorem 10. Let C [ {U} be a subset of MFm(V,C). Then:
(i) If C ‘NGKDðCÞ U then C
NGKDðCÞU;
(ii) Let V and C be ﬁnite. There exists a sufﬁciently large ﬁnite C0  C such that, if C 0NGKDðC0 Þ U, then C 2NGKDðC0 Þ U.
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0  C. The
proof begins exactly as the proof of Corollary 7 for NG0(C). Let n 2 N be the natural number found there such that Uw does
not follow from Cw [ Axw over Gn, D(C). If Cn # C then there exists n0 P n such that Cn0 ¼ C, and we take C0 ¼ Cn0 ¼ C. Other-
wise, if Cn  C then take n0 = n and C0 = Cn. Let v be a Gn0 ;DðC0Þ-evaluation such that v(W*) = 1 for each W 2 Cw [ Axw,
and v(U*) < 1.
Now consider the model M¼ ðW; e; IÞ where W is the ﬁnite set of C0-valued evaluations of propositional variables of V,
e :W  V? C0 is deﬁned as e(w,p) = w(p) and e(w, 	) is extended to Gn0 ;DðC0Þ-evaluations to formulas of Fm(V,C0) as usual.
Finally, the necessity I : dFmðV;C0Þ ! C0 is deﬁned as Iðu^Þ ¼ vððNuÞHÞ. Notice that now dFmðV;C0Þ is the set of all functions CW,
including all constant functions r for each r 2 C0. But, since v is a model of Axw containing all necessary instances of the
translation of (NKD), I is easily seen to satisfy also Iðð1 r _uÞ^Þ ¼ Ið1 r _ u^Þ ¼ maxð1 r; Iðu^ÞÞ, for every r 2 C0. Therefore,
by (i) of Lemma 2, there exists p :W ? C0 such that Iðu^Þ ¼ minw2W maxð1 pðwÞ;wðuÞÞ. HenceM¼ ðW; e; IÞ 2 NGKDðCÞ is a
model such that kWkM ¼ 1 for each W 2 C and kUkM < 1. h
6. The reciprocal of Gödel implication-based necessity logic NGRG(C)
To capture RG-necessities, let us assume again that C is closed under the standard negation, i.e. if r 2 C, then 1  r 2 C as
well. We deﬁne NGRG(C) as the axiomatic extension of NG0(G) over GD(C) with the following axiom:
(NRG) Nðu _ rÞ $ ð1 r ! NuÞ; for each r 2 C
and deﬁne N RGðCÞ as the subclass of NðCÞ structures M = (W,e, I) such that for every u 2 Fm(V,C), Iðu^Þ ¼ infw2WpðwÞ
)RG u^ðwÞ for a given possibility distribution p :W? [0,1] on the set of possible worlds W.
Then, using again Lemma 2 and an analog of Lemma 9 for NGRGðCÞ, one can prove the following result arguing as in the
proof of Theorem 10.
Theorem 11. Let C [ {U} be a subset of MFmðV ;CÞ. Then:
(i) If C ‘NGRGðCÞ U then C
NGRGðCÞU;
(ii) Let V and C be ﬁnite. There exists a sufﬁciently large ﬁnite C0  C closed by the standard negation such that, if C 0NGRGðC0 Þ U,
then C 2NGRGðC0 Þ U.
It is worth pointing out that if we add the Boolean axiom u _ :u to the logics NKDðCÞ and NRGðCÞ, both extensions would
basically collapse into the classical possibilistic logic.
7. The Gödel implication-based necessity logic NGðCÞ
Finally, to deﬁne a logic capturing NG-necessities, we need to expand the language of NG
0ðCÞ with an additional operator
P to capture the associated possibility measures according to Proposition 5. Therefore we consider the extended set
MFmðV ;CÞþ of modal formulasU,W ,. . . as those built from atomic modal formulas Nu and Pu, with u 2 Fm(V,C), truth-con-
stants r for each r 2 C# ½0;1 \Q and GD connectives. Then the axioms of the logic NPGðCÞ are those of GDðCÞ for non-modal
and modal formulas, plus the following necessity related modal axioms:
(N1) N(u? w)? (Nu? Nw),
(N2) NðrÞ $ r,
(P1) P(u _w)M (Pu _Pw),
(P2) PðrÞ $ r,
(P3) Pðu ^ rÞ $ ðPu ^ rÞ,
(NP) Nðu! rÞ $ ðPu! rÞ,
where ðN2Þ; ðP2Þ; ðP3Þ and ðNPÞ hold for each r 2 C. Inference rules of NPGðCÞ are those of GDðCÞ and necessitation for N
and P.
Now, we also need to consider expanded Kripke structures of the form M¼ hW; e; I; Pi, where W and e are as above
and the mappings I, P :? [0,1] are such that, for every u 2 Fm(V,C), Iðu^Þ ¼ infw2WpðwÞ )G u^ðwÞ and Pðu^Þ ¼
supw2W minðpðwÞ; u^ðwÞÞ, for some possibility distribution p :W? [0,1]. CallNPGðCÞ the class for such structures. Then, using
Proposition 5 we get the following result.
Theorem 12
(i) NPGðCÞ is sound w.r.t. the class NPGðCÞ of structures.
(ii) Let V be ﬁnite and let C [ {U} be a ﬁnite subset of MFm(V,C). There exists a sufﬁciently large ﬁnite C0  C such that if
C 0NPGðC0 Þ U then C 0NPGðC0 Þ U.
Table 1
Logics capturing different notions of necessity measures.
Logic Axioms Semantics M = (W,e, I) Implication function
NG0(C) N(u?w)? (Nu? Nw) Ið^rÞ ¼ r
NðrÞ $ r Iðu^ ^ w^Þ ¼minðIðu^Þ; Iðw^ÞÞ
NGKD(C) Nðr _uÞ $ ðr _ NuÞ, p :W? [0,1] Kleene–Dienes
Iðu^Þ ¼ infw2WpðwÞ )KD u^ðwÞ u)KD v = max(1  u,v)
NGRG(C) Nðu _ rÞ $ ð1 r ! NuÞ, p :W? [0,1] Reciprocal of Gödel
Iðu^Þ ¼ infw2WpðwÞ )RG u^ðwÞ u)RG v ¼ 1; if u 6 v1 u; other

NPG(C) Nðu! rÞ $ ðPu! rÞ M = (W,e, I,P), p :W? [0,1] Gödel
PðrÞ $ r Iðu^Þ ¼ infw2WpðwÞ )G u^ðwÞ u)G v ¼ 1; if u 6 vv ; other

P(u _ w)M (Pu _P w) Pðu^Þ ¼ supw2W minðpðwÞ; u^ðwÞÞ
Pðu ^ rÞ $ ðPu ^ rÞ
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M = (W,e, I,P) has been expanded with a mapping P : dFmðV;C0Þ ! C0 deﬁned by
 Pðu^Þ ¼ vððPuÞHÞ.
Then, it is easy to check that so deﬁned P is a basic possibility (see Deﬁnition 3). Moreover, since Axw contains the
necessary instances of axioms (N1), (N2), (P1), (P2), (P3), and (NP), the mappings I and P satisfy the conditions of
Proposition 5, and hence there exists p :W? C0 such that Iðu^Þ ¼minw2WpðwÞ )G wðuÞ and Pðu^Þ ¼maxw2W minðpðwÞ;
wðuÞÞ. Therefore M = (Wn,e, I,P) is a NPGðC0Þ-model satisfying all formulas in C but kUkM < 1. h
The main features of the four logics deﬁned so far are summarized in Table 1.
8. A common fragment of NGKDðCÞ; NGRGðCÞ and NGðCÞ
In this section we turn our attention to a fragment of the previous logics that is syntactically very close to classical pos-
sibilistic logic, consisting of formulas of the kind r ! Nu, where u contains neither additional truth-constants nor the D
operator, and r 2 C n{0}. By analogy to classical possibilistic logic, we will simply write (u,r) for r ! Nu.
Let PGL be the common fragment of NGKDðCÞ; NGRGðCÞ and NPGðCÞ over the language of formulas of the kind (u,r) and
axiomatized by the following axioms
– (u,1), with u being an axiom of Gödel logic
and the following inference rules:
– from (u,r), (u? w,s) infer (w,min(r,s)) (weighted modus ponens)
– from (u,r) infer (u,s), with s 6 r (weight weakening)
We will denote by ‘PGL the notion of deduction using the above axioms and rules. Since axiom ðKÞ and the
necessitation rule are present in all the three logics, PGL is sound with respect to the three classes of Kripke models
N KDðCÞ, N RGðCÞ and NPGðCÞ. Moreover we can show that deductions in PGL and in Gödel logic are very related, mimicking
the relationship between deductions in (classical) possibilistic logic and CPC deductions within stratiﬁed propositional logic
formulas.
In the following, for any set of PGL-formulas T = {(w1,r1), . . . , (wm,rm)}, we will denote by Ts ¼ fwjðw; rÞ 2 T and r P sg and
by T* the whole set {w1, . . . ,wm} of the underlying set of Gödel logic formulas.
Lemma 13. Let T = {(w1, r1), . . . , (wm,rm)}. Then T ‘PGL (u,s) iff Ts ‘G u.Proof. Easy by noticing that proofs can be easily transferred from one logic to the other and that if a formula (wi,ri) 2 T is
used in the proof of (u,s), because of the two inference rules, then necessarily s 6 ri. hLemma 14. Let L 2 {NGKD(C),NGRG(C),NPG(C)}, and let T be a ﬁnite set of PGL-formulas. If T L (u, r) for some r > 0, then T* G u.
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that w is a model of T* and let pw be the possibility distribution such that pw(w) = 1 and pw(w0) = 0 for w0 –w. Consider then
the Kripke model Mw = (W,e, Iw) where W is the set of G-evaluations for G-formulas, and Iwðw^Þ ¼ infw02Wpwðw0Þ ) w0ðwÞ,
where )2 {)KD,)RG,)G}.
Let L 2 {NGKD(C),NPG(C)}. An easy computation shows that, for any GDðCÞ-formula w, kNwkMw ¼ wðwÞ and hence
Mw  (w,r) iff w(w)P r. Therefore, Mw is clearly a model of T. Therefore we have proved that for each G-model w of T*,
w(u)P r, in other words, T
GDðCÞr ! u, and using the deduction theorem for the logic GDðCÞ, 
GDðCÞr ! ðD/T ! uÞ, where
/T is the conjunction of all the formulas of the theory T*. Now, using results from [20],6 it holds that 
GDD/T ! u, i.e. T
GDu,
and since T* and u do not contain the D connective, this is equivalent to T* G u.
Let L ¼ NGRGðCÞ. In this case, kNwkMw ¼ 0 ifw(w) < 1 and kNwkMw ¼ 1 otherwise. HenceMw  (w,r) with r > 0 iffw(w) = 1.
Therefore, Mw is clearly a model of T. Therefore we have proved that for each G-model w of T*, w(u) = 1, in other words,
T* G u. h
The next theorem shows partial completeness results for PGL with respect to the three different representable notions of
necessity measures.
Theorem 15. Let L 2 {NGKD(C),NGRG(C),NPG(C)}. Let T = {(w1, r1), . . . , (wm,rm)} be a ﬁnite set of PGL-formulas. Then, if T ‘PGL (u, r)
then T L (u, r). Conversely, if T L (u, r) with r > 0, then T ‘PGL (u,min(r1, . . . , rm)).Proof. One direction is soundness. As for the other direction, let T = {(w1,r1), . . . , (wm,rm)} and assume T L (u,r). By Lemma
14, T* G u, and by completeness of Gödel logic, T* ‘G u. Finally, by Lemma 13, T ‘PGL (u,min(r1, . . . ,rm)). h9. Some complexity issues
Let L 2 {NG0(C),NKD(C),NRG(C),NPG(C)}. We begin by showing that, whenever we ﬁx the set of propositional variables, the
satisﬁability problem for L is decidable in polynomial time.
Theorem 16. Let U a formula in the L-language with n propositional variables. Then, checking the satisﬁability of U is a problem
decidable in polynomial time.Proof. We just deal with NG0ðCÞ; the other cases are similar and left to the reader.
Following the completeness proof, satisﬁability of U in NG0ðCÞ is equivalent to the satisﬁability of a theory in GDðCÞ
obtained as translation fromU as follows. LetUw be obtained fromU by replacing every occurrence of an atomic subformula
of the form Nu by a new propositional variable pu. Then, inductively deﬁne the mappingw from modal formulas into GDðCÞ-
formulas as follows:
– (N(u))w = pu,
– ðrÞH ¼ r,
– (U?W)w =Uw?Ww,
– (D(U))w = D(Uw).
Let, therefore, C be the union of Uw and FH deﬁned as6 In [
of the fo
particulFH ¼ f!Hj! is an instance of the axiomsg [ fpuj ‘GDðCÞ ug;
where all the non-modal formulas belong to FnðGDðCÞÞ, the GDðCÞ-algebra of equivalence classes of formulas over n genera-
tors modulo provable equivalence. Notice that FH is a ﬁnite theory over GDðCÞwhose language has as new propositional vari-
ables Var0 ¼ fpuju 2 FnðGDðCÞÞg. The cardinality of FH depends only on the original number of variables n.
Now, checking the satisﬁability of U over NG0(C) is equivalent to checking the satisﬁability of UH [ FH over GD(C). Since
the number of variables in Var0 is ﬁxed once we ﬁx n, we only need to consider a chain with jVar0j + 1 elements. Then, in order
to decide the computation problem for the satisﬁability of UH [ FH, it is enough to calculate the truth table corresponding to
a formula over a (jVar0j + 1)-valued G-chain, and hence it is linear in the length of the formula. h
Notice that the above translation works whenever the number of variables is ﬁxed beforehand. The most interesting and
general case, in which the number of variables is not speciﬁed, still is an open problem.
Finally, as for the fragment PGL, it be can easily noticed that the problem of deciding whether (u,r) can be deduced from a
ﬁnite theory T, i.e. whether T ‘PGL (u,r) holds true, is equivalent to deciding whether Tr ‘G u holds true in Gödel logic, which
is known to be a co-NP complete problem (see e.g. [22]).20] the author studies the functions from the unit hypercube [0,1]n into [0,1] associated to formulas of Gödel logic (with n being the number of variables
rmula) and from the form of these functions it follows that there is no Gödel logic formula u such that, given r 2 (0,1], v(u)P r for each valuation v. In
ar this means that if, for some truth-constant r > 0 from C, r ! u is a tautology of GDðCÞ, then necessarily u itself must be a tautology of Gödel logic.
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Several issues related to the logics we have introduced in this paper deserve further investigation. These logics are not
proper modal logics, since the notion of well-formed formula excludes those formulas with occurrences of nested modalities.
Work in progress is devoted to the study of the Possibilistic Necessity Gödel logic (PNG, for short), presented in [9]. PNG is a
full fuzzy modal logic for graded necessity over Gödel logic, that is, a modal expansion of the [0,1]-valued Gödel logic with a
modality N such that the truth-value of a formula Nu (in [0,1]) can be interpreted as the degree of necessity of u, according
to some suitable semantics. The language of PNG is deﬁned as follows: formulas of PNG are built from the set of G-formulas
using G-connectives and the operator N. Axioms of PNG are those of Gödel logic plus the following modal axioms:
1. N(u? w)? (Nu? Nw).
2. NwM NNw.
3. :N0.
Deduction rules for PNG are Modus Ponens and Necessitation for N (from w derive Nw). These axioms and rules deﬁne a
notion of proof ‘PNG in the usual way. It would be worth to study in depth the relation between PNG and the logic of Basic
Necessity NG0(C) (and of some of its meaningful axiomatic extensions). Since the logic PNG may only capture the logic of
basic necessities, additional axioms (and possibly operators as well) must be considered in order to capture more speciﬁc
families of necessities, as those related to axioms (NKD), (NRG), (P3) or the axiom (NP). For instance, a candidate axiom as
the PNG counterpart of (NKD) isNðNu _ wÞ $ Nu _ Nw
and a candidate counterpart of (NRG) would beNðNu _ wÞ $  Nu! Nw;
where  is an additional involutive negation, andPðu ^PwÞ $ Pu ^Pw;
Nðu! NwÞ $ Pu! Nwwould be candidate axioms for counterparts of (P3) and (NP), respectively.
From the algebraic study of speciﬁc logics a general theory of the algebraization of logics slowly emerged during the last
century with the aim of obtaining general results relating the properties of a logic with the properties of the class of algebras
(or algebra related structures) associated with it. The algebraizable logics are purported to be the logics with the strongest
possible link with their natural class of algebras. A precise concept of algebraic semantics and of algebraizable logic was
introduced by Blok and Pigozzi in [5]. The main point in Blok and Pigozzi’s concept of algebraic semantics comes from
the realization that the set of designated elements considered in the algebraic semantics of known logics is in fact the set
of solutions of an equation. Then, in the study of a logic, we should ﬁnd an equational way to deﬁne uniformly in every alge-
bra a set of designated elements in order to obtain an algebraic soundness and completeness theorem. In [9] we showed that
PNG is ﬁnitely algebraizable and has a strong completeness algebraic theorem. Future work will be devoted to study further
the algebraic semantics of PNG, the class of NG-algebras. From an algebraic point of view, it seems interesting also to inves-
tigate faithful NG-algebras (see [9]) since they enjoy very nice properties.
As mentioned in Section 2, Gödel propositional logic is an extension of the Intuitionistic logic Int, by the axiom of pre-
linearity. Hence, necessity-valued Gödel logics could be regarded as extensions of the Intuitionistic Modal Logic IntKh, which
is axiomatized by adding to Int axioms K, h(p ^ q)M (hp ^hq) and h> and whose deduction rules are Modus Ponens and
Necessitation for h. The logic IntKh and its extensions were introduced and investigated in different articles, among them
[7,26,27,28]. Kripke style models for intuitionistic modal logics using two accessibility relations between worlds, one of
which is intuitionistic and the other one modal, were introduced in [28], and a completeness theorem for IntKh using this
semantics and the standard canonical model technique can be found in [10]. In the future we would like to explore the rela-
tionship between the logics introduced in this paper and fragments of well-known many-valued modal logics in the litera-
ture (see e.g. [6]). Among them, specially relevant for our research are the Gödel modal logics studied by Caicedo and
Rodríguez in [8].Acknowledgments
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